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dr. Fisa or: how i learned to stoP worrying and 
trust the nsa
emmanuel klint-gassner
 i. introduction
 In June 2013, Edward Snowden, a former contractor with the National Security Agency 
(NSA), leaked information about the NSA’s information collection programs.1  Edward Snowden 
worked with the Guardian newspaper to leak more classified documents and information over the 
next few months.2  The first of  these leaks involved the NSA’s collection program on domestic 
telecommunications metadata.  Then came leaks about Internet metadata being collected as well. 
Newspapers around the world inflated articles about how the United States was “spying” on its own 
citizens.  More leaks followed, detailing U.S. spying activities on Chinese computers, and throughout 
Europe.3  Edward Snowden claimed he was a whistle blower, and that he leaked the confidential 
documents because he felt that the United States’ collection programs were morally wrong, and that 
they should not be kept from the general public.4  Whether Edward Snowden is a whistle blower 
or a traitor is beyond the scope of  this paper.  However, Mr. Snowden’s disclosures did more than 
just put smiles on our enemies’ faces, it spurred a huge debate about surveillance, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the NSA, technology, and how all these elements are combined 
and used by the government. 
 This paper will focus on scratching the itch. The annoying itch that Americans got when 
Edward Snowden told them that the Government was watching. The itch that makes one wonder 
if  George Orwell’s Big Brother5 is in fact the United States Government — they might even be 
watching you right now. The fact that the government has the technology, ability, and authority 
to collect massive amounts of  information on “everyday” private citizens makes Americans 
uncomfortable — like an itch that we just can’t scratch. 
 This is not the first time that Americans have had to deal with uncomfortable news from 
our government.  During the Cold War, Americans were dealing with the idea of  nuclear bombs 
destroying the world. Popular culture, with everyone from novelists to Hollywood, came up with 
1 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of  Millions of  Verizon Customers Daily, guardian, June 6, 2013, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
2 Glenn Greenwald, Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, guardian, June 9, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance.
3 Scott Shane & Ravi Somaiya, New Leak Indicates Britain and US Tracked Diplomats, n.y. times, June 16, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/world/europe/new-leak-indicates-us-and-britain-eavesdropped-at-09-world-
conferences.html.
4 Laura Poitras & Glenn Greenwald, NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: I Don’t Want to Live in a Society that Does These 
Sort of  Things, guardian, June 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-
edward-snowden-interview-video.
5 George Orwell, 1984 (1949).
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fictional cures for the atomic dilemma.6  This is exemplified by Stanley Kubrick’s suggestion that 
we should “learn to live with (love) the bomb.”7  After 9/11 Americans are no longer (as) worried 
about superpowers and their nuclear weapons; the idea of  terrorist groups, not states, rule the fears 
of  everyday Americans.  The fact that nineteen terrorists could cause the death of  3,000 Americans 
on American soil was a shock.  Terrorists are different than America’s previous enemies.  They are 
not necessarily state actors, they are spread out across the world, they use technology just like we do, 
and their goal is non corporeal.8  Terrorists have different motivations, different goals, and different 
means of  attack, which is what makes them so frightening. After 9/11, President Bush announced 
that America would fight back with the War on Terror. Learning to live with the open-ended war on 
terror means learning to live with intelligence, technology, surveillance—the itch.9 
 This paper will focus on how Americans can learn to live with, though probably not love, 
the technology and procedures that were recently disclosed by Edward Snowden. In other words, to 
soothe the itch just a little bit, by learning about the details of  bulk metadata collection and how the 
government uses it. It should be noted that the practices and policies that have been disclosed are 
not perfect, there is always room for improvement, and this paper is not positing that there are not 
issues of  concern that should be addressed. 
 This paper will first discuss what metadata actually is, how the NSA uses the bulk metadata, 
how the information is retained, queried, and why it is used. Then this paper will go into a 
brief  history of  electronic surveillance and FISA. Finally, this paper will discuss the interaction 
between the Fourth Amendment and metadata collections and the arguments surrounding the 
constitutionality of  bulk metadata collection. 
ii. “nsa collecting Phone records oF millions oF verizon customers daily”10 
 The 2013 Guardian article was not the first time allegations about the Government listening 
to Americans’ phone calls had appeared in the media.11  In 2005, the New York Times ran an article 
about how the Bush administration was listening to calls without judicial warrants.12  However, the 
2005 articles did not elicit any acknowledgement from the government.  At the time few details 
about the programs were known and so the article simply referred to the NSA as “eavesdropping” 
on Americans’ calls.13   
6 Wesley Wark, Introduction: Learning to Live with Intelligence, 18 intelligence and national security, no. 4, 2008, at 1, 
1-14. 
7 dr. strangelove or: how i learned to stoP worrying and love the BomB (Colombia Pictures 1963).
8 See Wark, supra note 6, at 1-14.
9 See id.
10 See Greenwald, supra note 1.
11 David Kris, On the Bulk Collection of  Tangible Things, lawFare research PaPer series, Sept. 29, 2013.
12 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, n.y. times, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As%2C
%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A14%22%7D&_r=0.
13 Id.; see Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of  Americans’ Phone Calls, usa today, May 11, 2006, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm (explaining that the 2005 disclosure was the also the 
subject of  litigation); see e,g., Hepting v. AT &T, 439 F. Supp. 974, 978 (2006) (“Plaintiffs allege that AT& T Corporation 
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 The 2013 Snowden leaks disclosed details of  programs where the NSA was not 
eavesdropping on calls but simply collecting metadata.14  But what is metadata? Put simply metadata 
is “information about information.”15  The FISA Court order allowing the collection of  metadata 
included “comprehensive routing information, including but not limited to session identifying 
information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), 
trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of  call.”16  The order also 
stated that the metadata produced “does not include the substantive content of  any communication, 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of  a subscriber or 
customer.”17  While the contents of  messages are not being recorded, some scholars argue that the 
cumulative information of  the metadata discloses substantive facts about a person and therefore is a 
violation of  the Fourth Amendment.18 
 Because of  the sensation around the Edward Snowden leaks, the government declassified 
documents and published legal reasoning behind the bulk metadata collection. These disclosures 
revealed many things about the NSA programs and the FISA court. These disclosures reveal that 
while there is the necessary element of  secrecy surrounding the NSA collections procedures they 
are not without oversight, which should alleviate some of  the public’s fear about the bulk metadata 
collections. 
i. the Foreign intelligence surveillance court (Fisc) orders
 First, some of  the important documents released were FISC “Primary Order”19 which was 
directed to the government, and the “Secondary Order” which was directed at a telecommunications 
. . .  are collaborating with the NSA in a massive warrantless surveillance program that illegally tracks the domestic and 
foreign communications and communication records of  millions of  Americans.”).
14 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 12.
15 Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret Mass Surveillance in the US and Europe, 10 
isJlP (forthcoming 2014).
16 In Re Application of  the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of  Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. 
Network Servs., Inc., on Behalf  of  MCI Commc’n Servs., Inc. d/b/a/ Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13-80 (FISA Ct. 
2013) at 2 [hereinafter “215 Bulk Secondary Order”]; see In re Application of  the Federal Bureau of  Investigation for 
an Order Requiring the Production of  Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. 2013) at 2 n. 2 
[hereinafter “August 2013 FISC Opinion”]  (explaining that an IMSI number is usually a 15 digit number that identifies 
the telephone used in the mobile telephone network, and it is usually associated with the telephone’s subscriber identity 
module (SIM) card that authenticates the telephone to the network. An IMEI number on the other hand is similar but it 
is identified with the telephone itself); see Newell, supra note 15, at 8.
17 See 50 U.S.C.A. §1801(n) (stating that FISA defines “contents” as “any information concerning the identity of  
the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of  that communication.”  This 
differs from §2510(8) because it includes information concerning the existence of  a communication and the identity 
of  the parties to it); see 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 2; see August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, 
at 2 n. 2 (noting that Under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (8) “content” is defined to include “any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of  that communication”); see also, David S. Kris & J. Douglas Wilson, national security 
investigations and Prosecutions §§ 7:11, 18:2 (2013) [hereinafter “Kris &Wilson NSIP”].
18 See infra Part V.B (discussing on the Mosaic theory).
19 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16; August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16.
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provider.20  The “Primary Order” set out various requirements and limitations on the government 
during its collection and for use of  the telephony metadata.21  The primary and secondary orders 
are issued by FISC for ninety days at a time, and they have been renewed consistently since they 
were first issued in 2006.22  Only one secondary order directed at one company has been disclosed, 
although the government has confirmed that FISC has approved similar orders for around three23 
telecommunications companies to produce metadata.24  As of  July 2013, FISC had authorized 
the bulk metadata collection on thirty-four separate occasions by fourteen different judges.25  
Withstanding accusations of  the FISC merely being a rubber stamp for the NSA, the fact that the 
bulk metadata program has to be reauthorized at regular intervals, and by varying judges ensures that 
legal reasoning, rather than bureaucratic pressure, is the driving force behind the orders. 
ii. what inFormation the nsa gets From the metadata
As previously discussed the metadata collected does not include contents of  the communication, 
the identity, or any data about the physical location of  the call other than the area code of  the phone 
number.26  When General Keith Alexander was asked if  the NSA could tell the location of  a call, 
or signal strength, or identify the specific tower of  the call, he responded that the only locational 
information that is received in the database through the metadata is area code of  the phone 
number.27  Additionally, if  the government wanted information about the cell site, or any locational 
information as part of  a bulk production of  call records, the government would have to provide 
20 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 1.
21 How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans and Why Disclosure Aids our Adversaries: Hearing before the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (June 18 2013), available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/57812486681/hearing-
of-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on [hereinafter “June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing”] (statement of  James Cole, 
discussing how the Primary Order “ . . . . goes into great detail [about] what we can do with the metadata. How we can 
access it, how we can look through it, what we can do with it once we have looked through it. . . .”).
22 See generally Press Release, ODNI, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Renews Authority to Collect Telephony 
Metadata (July 19, 2013), at http://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191=press -releases-2013/898-
foreign-intelligence-surveilllence-court-renews-authority-to-collect-telephony-metadata; see Section 215, NSA Factsheet 
(June 18, 2013), available at http://www.wyeden.senate.gov/nes/blog/postwyden-and-udall-to-general-alexander-nsa-
must-correct-inaccurate-statement-in-fact-sheet [hereinafter “NSA 215 Factsheet”]; Administration White Paper: 
Bulk Collection of  Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 of  the USA Patriot Act (Aug 9, 2013) at 1, available at http://
publicintelilgnece.net/doj-bulk-telephony-collection [hereinafter “White Paper”]; see also August 2013 FISC Opinion, 
supra note 16.
23 Aspen Institute, Counterterrorism, National Security and the Rule of  Law, (July 28, 2013) available at http://
aspensecurityforum.org/2013-video (statement of  Rajesh De).
24 Bob Litt, Privacy, Technology and National Security: An Overview of  Intelligence Collection, (July 19, 2013) [hereinafter “2013 
Litt Speech”] http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/odni-gc-bob-litt-speaking-at-brookings/.
25 See White Paper, supra note 22, at 3.
26 August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 2 n. 2; see June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  
Chris Inglis: Question: “So there are no names and no addresses affiliated with these phone numbers?” Answer: “No, 
there are not, sir.”); see id. (statement of  General Keith Alexander: Question: “Does the American government have 
a database that has the GPS location/whereabouts of  Americans, whether it’s by our cellphones or by other tracking 
device? Is- is there a known database?” Answer: “NSA does not hold such a database.”).
27 See id.
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briefing, notice, and approval from FISC.28 
iii. metadata storage
 The disclosures from the government also described how the metadata is stored.  Once the 
metadata is collected it is stored within the secure networks of  the NSA, and is uniquely identified. 
This data can then only be accessed by specifically cleared counterterrorism personnel that have 
been trained in the court procedures. Each area of  data requires different trainings, so a certificate 
is required.29  Without the specific certificate for the matching database, an employee is unable to 
access the metadata records.30  
iv. metadata access
 The procedures for accessing the database of  metadata are clearly defined for the specific 
purpose of  counterterrorism.  This is especially important to note when discussing the line between 
the Fourth Amendment protections and the metadata collections.31  Only a small amount of  the 
metadata is ever actually accessed.32  The stored metadata may only be accessed for intelligence 
purposes when there is a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts that a particular identifier, 
like a phone number, is associated with a terrorist group.33  The government must get approval 
from FISC for queries, specifying to which terrorists or targets a query relates.  The government’s 
applications to query the database are for specific terrorists that are the subject of  a terrorism 
investigation.34 
v. Finding oF reasonaBle articulaBle susPicion
 For the element of  reasonable suspicion to be fulfilled when presenting a request to query 
the database, the suspicion must not only be reasonable but must also have an articulated level of  
suspicion.  One of  twenty analysts at the NSA and two supervising managers must approve this 
28 August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 4 n. 5.
29 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  General Keith Alexander)(explaining that Snowden 
would have access to the information about how they procure the metadata, but because he didn’t have the correct 
training or certificates he would not have been able to actually see the data that had been collected. In order to work with 
each set of  data, a person must be trained and have a certificate to work with that data. In other words, the certificate is a 
key to the data.).
30 See NSA 215 Factsheet, supra note 22; see June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  General Keith 
Alexander); see also August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 4-5 nn.2-3.
31 See infra Part V.
32 See 2013 Litt Speech, supra note 24.
33 Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney to Representative Sensenbrenner (July 16, 2013) 
[hereinafter Sensenbrenner Letter], available at http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ag_holder_response_to_
congressman_sensenbrenner_on_fisa.pdf.
34 See 2013 Litt Speech, supra note 24.
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reasonable suspicion.35  Any authorized analyst who wants to query the database must have another 
authorized analyst also agree that there is a reasonable suspicion.  Essentially there is always a two 
person control rule, with one of  the analysts or managers providing oversight.36  These twenty 
two NSA officials are specially designated and trained and are the only people that can make a 
finding that there is a reasonable articulable suspicion that a seed identifier37 proposed for query is 
associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization.38  If  any of  the numbers that are suspected 
involve the possibility of  being connected to U.S. persons,39 the NSA Office of  General Counsel 
must review and approve such findings before the query is searched in the database.40  
 Findings of  reasonable articulable suspicion must be made in writing in advance of  the 
query being submitted and executed.41  There are only seven officials in the NSA who can approve 
queries.42  Individual queries are not reviewed by FISC,43 but the Court sets out the criteria for the 
queries and receives regular reports every thirty days44 on the number of  identifiers used to query 
the metadata as well as the number of  times a U.S. person’s information is returned in the results.45  
A finding of  a reasonable articulable suspicion is good for 180 days when involving U.S. persons and 
for one year for queries on non-U.S. persons.46  There is an extra layer of  protection for a finding of  
reasonable articulable suspicion for selectors believed to be for or of  U.S. persons.  NSA’s General 
Counsel must determine that the reasonable articulable suspicion is not based solely on First 
35 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Chris Inglis).
36 Id.
37 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Chris Inglis); see also Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 
33, at 2 (explaining that a seed identifier is a telephone number that is used as a query).
38 White Paper, supra note 22, at 5.
39 See James R. Clapper, DNI statement of  Activities Authorized under 702 of  FISA, oFFice oF the director oF national 
intelligence (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-
2013/869-dni-statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa (responding to articles in the Guardian and 
the Washington Post, DNI Clapper issued a statement that the activities cannot be used to intentionally target any US 
citizen or any other American or anyone located in the United States.); see also 50 U.S.C. §1801(i) (“United States person” 
means a citizen of  the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101 (a)
(20) of  title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of  members of  which are citizens of  the United 
States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, 
but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) 
of  this section.”); Eric Holder Jr., Attorney General, Exhibit B: Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency 
Connection with Acquisitions of  Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of  
1978, As Amended July 28, 2009, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-026.
pdf  (defining guidelines determining what a US person is in regards to metadata collection).
40 See August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 7.
41 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  James Cole); see Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 33, 
at 3.
42 See August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 7 n. 6.
43 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  James Cole); see 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra 
note 16, at 16.
44 See NSA 215 Factsheet, supra note 22 (stating that the NSA has other reporting duties as well concerning the queries 
into the metadata database. There are the 30 day reports to the FISC, 90 day meetings of  NSA, DOJ and ODNI and 90 
day meetings between the NSA and its inspector general.).
45 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 16.
46 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 10; August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, Order at 10.
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Amendment activities.47 
vi. hoPs
 In 2012, around 300 identifiers met the reasonable articulable suspicion standard and were 
queried in the database.48  While there were only 300 identifiers, the NSA is allowed to query them 
multiple times.49  Each initial query may produce two additional “hops”50 or numbers that are related 
to the initial query.  Under the FISC order, the NSA may obtain information concerning the second 
and third tier contacts of  the original seed identifier.  The first hop relates to a set of  numbers that 
are in direct contact with the seed identifier.  The second hop numbers related to the numbers found 
from the first hop and the third hop represents numbers that are connected to the second hop.51  
 NSA agency officials have stated that even though they are allowed up to a three-hop 
analysis, analysts are careful to not overuse this, and rarely get to the third tier hop.52  For example, 
in 2012 the NSA provided twelve reports to the FBI, which included less than 500 numbers that 
had been generated by the queries and their related hops.53  The hops are mainly used to determine 
patterns and to understand the manners and methods by which targets network and communicate 
with each other.54 
vii. data-mining or contact chaining
 Prior to 2006, the NSA developed an “alert list” process to assist in the review of  the 
telephony metadata it received.  The alert list contained the telephone identifiers that NSA was 
targeting for collection, including some that had not met the reasonable articulable suspicion 
standard.  The NSA automated system then ran the targeted numbers against the telephony 
metadata set.55  Since 2006, the NSA has not been authorized to use this type of  data mining 
technique.  The government has not disclosed any documents indicating data mining, contact 
47 August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 7-9.
48 See Senate Judiciary Committee Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security; Oversight of  FISA Surveillance Programs, 
(July 31, 2013) [hereinafter “July SJC Hearing”] (statement of  Senator Feinstein), available at http://icontherecord.
tumblr.com/post/57811913209/hearing-of-the-senate-judiciary-committee-on; see NSA 215 Factsheet, supra note 22; see 
Sensenbrenner Letter, supra note 33.
49 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Chris Inglis).
50 House Judiciary Committee: Oversight of  the Administration’s use of  FISA Authorities (July 17, 2013) [hereinafter “July 2013 
HJC Hearing”] (statement of  Chris Inglis).
51 White Paper, supra note 22, at 4.
52 July 2013 HJC Hearing, (statement of  Chris Inglis).
53 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 11.
54 Id.
55 Memorandum of  the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated January 28, 2009 No. BR-08-13 (Feb. 
17, 2009),  https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc-021209.pdf.
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chaining56 or other automated programs related to the bulk metadata production.57 
 However, the NSA can receive data under other legal authority that may not be subject 
to the FISA and FISC rulings.58  Alternative methods of  metadata collection would include bulk 
metadata collection that is under Executive Order 12333.59  NSA technicians under the FISA orders 
may access the metadata to manage the data to make it more useable and identify high volume 
numbers that are for non-terrorist activities such as telemarketing.60 
viii. disseminating metadata inFormation oF interest relating to a u.s. Person
 Only seven senior officials at the NSA may authorize the dissemination of  any information 
that might be attributable to a U.S. person.61  The information can only be made available to the 
FBI, and only if  the information is related to and or necessary to understand a counterterrorism 
initiative.62 
 The NSA has a strict policy for when a U.S. person’s information is received.  If  the U.S. 
person’s information received was unintentional, inadvertent, or as reverse targeting (someone 
targeted a foreign entity who is known to communicated with a U.S. person) collection, an analyst 
must stop collection immediately, cancel all reports based on that collection, notify their superior 
or auditor, write up an incident report immediately, and submit the incident write up for inclusion 
in the Inspector General Quarterly review.63  If  an analyst targets a legitimate foreign entity and 
information and or communications are acquired from or about a U.S. person, minimization 
procedures must be put in place, and the focus must be on the foreign end of  the report.64  Since it 
is found incidental to a search it does not have to be included in the Inspector General’s Quarterly 
review.65 
56 See Memorandum from Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, Subject: Proposed Amendment to 
Department of  Defense Procedures to Permit the National Security Agency to Conduct Analysis of  Communications 
Metadata Associated with Persons in the United States, to the Attorney General, November 20, 2007 at 2 available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world.interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-data-collection-justice -department (explaining that 
contact chaining involves the use of  computer algorithms to create a chain of  contacts linking telephone numbers, 
IP addresses, addresses, and email addresses of  target.  This is a document that was disclosed by Snowden via the 
Guardian and has not been officially recognized by the government. For the purposes of  this paper it will only provide 
background information and definitions.).
57 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 6.
58 See August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 10 n. 10.
59 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f).
60 See 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra note 16, at 5-6; see also August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, 5-6.a
61 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Chris Inglis).
62 See id.
63 (U) Lesson 4: So you got U.S. Person Information?, available at https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/15/20130816-
wapo-so_you_got_a_us_person.pdf.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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ix. minimization Procedures
 Metadata that has not been reviewed, which is the majority of  metadata received, is retained 
for about five years,66 and is then automatically deleted from the NSA’s system on a rolling basis.67  
Data that has been collected improperly is also purged.68  For the acquisition, retention, use, or 
dissemination of  non-publically available information concerning non-consenting U.S. persons, 
strict procedures are in place to minimize the data.69  The most important part of  the minimization 
procedures is having analysts review the data and make a reasonable judgment if  the data is from or 
about a U.S. person.  This can be very difficult especially in Internet and phone metadata because 
the data does not have any locational identifiers, except area codes and ISP addresses which are not 
dispositive of  locational confirmation.  Once an analyst determines that the data belongs to a U.S. 
person, minimization procedures take precedent and unless an exception is applicable, the data is 
destroyed immediately.70  
 Domestic information or information that is by or about a U.S. person will not be destroyed 
if  the communication is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence information, 
or reasonably believed to contain evidence of  a serious crime that has been, is being, or is about 
to be committed,71 or in situations where the technical data is needed to understand a foreign 
intelligence operational concern, or lastly if  there is evidence of  a national security threat or threat 
to human life.72  If  the communication intercepted happens to contain attorney client privilege 
communication about a person who is known to be under criminal indictment in the United States, 
the communication monitoring will cease immediately, and procedures are put in place to protect the 
data and it cannot be used in the criminal case.73 
x. comPliance issues
 There have been several reported compliance issues, the vast majority of  which were 
self-identified from the NSA, because of  the in house procedures in place.74  Once a compliance 
66 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Chris Inglis); see 215 Bulk Secondary Order, supra 
note 16, at 4.
67 National Security Agency Central Security Service, USSID-18, 27 July 1993,  http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB24/nsa11a.pdf.
68 See June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Chris Inglis).
69 Minimization Procedures used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of  Foreign Intelligence Information 
Pursuant to Section 702 of  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of  1978, as amended, Oct. 21, 2011, [hereinafter “NSA 
Minimization Procedures”] http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-038.pdf.
70 Id.
71 See id. (explaining that if  the communication is about a crime, the information may be disseminated, including the 
US person identities to appropriate Federal law enforcing authorities in accordance with 50 U.S.C. §1806(b) and §1825(c). 
After dissemination the NSA can only keep the data for up to six months, unless authorized by the Attorney General to 
allow reasonable access for the law enforcement agencies if  needed.).
72 See NSA Minimization Procedures, supra note 69.
73 See id.
74 June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  Bob Litt and General Keith Alexander).
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issue is identified, the NSA works with the FISC judges to correct what has gone awry.75  Often 
the mistake is human error, such as transposing numbers or letters which, for querying purposes, 
make a big difference. However, there has never been a finding of  an intentional violation of  the 
court orders.76  Once a mistake is submitted to the FISC, the FISC demands an in-depth analysis 
of  what went wrong, why, what has been done to remedy the situation, and if  the NSA has gotten 
rid of  the information wrongly procured.77  In addition to individual compliance reports, the FISC 
receives quarterly reports about compliance issues.78  Several good examples of  FISC oversight 
and compliance with the NSA have been released.79  The NSA is also audited by the Department 
of  Justice, the Office of  the Director of  National Intelligence and the Attorney General.80  It is 
important to note, that throughout these years of  audits, none of  the compliance incidents have 
involved the application of  the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, which is at the foundation 
of  the metadata program.81 
xi. the PurPose oF it all
 One of  the biggest problems the United States faces in preventing terrorists’ attacks is the 
identification of  terrorists and their networks.82  Whilst identifying specific spies and or plots by 
enemies was important in previous years, the government usually had an idea of  who the enemy was. 
With the advent of  increased terrorist activity, the government is not fighting against one group, 
but multiple small groups scattered throughout the world.83  Terrorists groups come in all sizes, 
from all nations, and with differing goals, hence identification is particularly difficult and important. 
Communication between countries and therefore terrorists groups has never been easier than now 
considering the near-global ubiquity of  the Internet and cell phones.84  
 The United States uses the metadata it collects to identify present and future terrorist plots, 
75 See id.
76 See id. (statement of  James Cole).
77 Id.
78 White Paper, supra note 22, at 5.
79 See Memorandum Opinion, (October 3, 2011 FISC Ct.); see also Memorandum Opinion, (Nov. 2011 FISC Ct.); see 
also August 2013 FISC Opinion, supra note 16, at 5 (“The court is aware that in prior years there have been incidents of  
non-compliance with respect to NSA’s handling of  produced information. Through oversight by the court over a period 
of  months, those issues were resolved.”).
80 See Department of  Justice and Office of  the Director of  National Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of  Compliance 
with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney 
General and the Director of  National Intelligence, Reporting Period: December 1, 2008- May 31, 2009, (December 
2009); see also Department of  Justice and Office of  the Director of  National Intelligence, Semiannual Assessment of  
Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of  the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the 
Attorney General and the Director of  National Intelligence, Reporting Period: June 1, 2009-November 30, 2009, (May 2010).
81 June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  General Keith Alexander).
82 White Paper, supra note 22, at 2.
83 Robert J. Hanyok, The First Round: NSA’s Effort against International Terrorism in the 1970s, cryPtologic almanac, 
November- December 2002.
84 A. Denis Clift, Intelligence in the Internet Era, studies in intelligence 73 (Fall 2003), http://www2.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-008.pdf.
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using crime mapping and network analysis.85  The metadata collection program was specifically 
designed to assist the U.S. Government in detecting communications between known or suspected 
terrorists who are operating outside of  the United States and who are communicating with others 
inside the United States, as well as communication between operatives within the United States.86  
By doing so, the program helps to close the critical intelligence gaps that were highlighted by the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.87 
iii. this ain’t our First rodeo
 In order to understand wiretapping, telephony metadata, and surveillance it is important to 
look at the history of  surveillance, with a special emphasis on electronic surveillance. The history of  
electronic surveillance leads right into the creation of  FISA, and how Congress came to the current 
understanding of  FISA, and electronic surveillance for national security purposes.
i. in the Beginning
 Surveillance and spying is not a new concept.  Nor is domestic surveillance, and its ensuing 
controversy.  In 1797, Secretary of  State Timothy Pickering hired a private agent to investigate 
a conspiracy between the British navy and Senator William Blount.88  In 1862, Secretary of  War 
Edwin M. Stanton asked President Lincoln for complete control over the telegraph lines.89  The 
President granted this authority and soon the telegraph lines running through Stanton’s office made 
his department the nexus of  war information.  He used power over the telegraphs to influence what 
the journalists did or did not publish, and arrested dozens of  journalists on questionable charges.90  
After the war ended, Congress addressed this use of  telegraph censorship and reprimanded the 
administration. 
 In World War I the government took over operation of  the phones as a wartime measure.91  
In 1924, Attorney General Harlan Stone, seeking to recover credibility from recent scandals 
85 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Intelligence Exploitation of  the Internet, (October 2002), available at http://www2.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-005.pdf  (discussing the early implications for electronic 
privacy); see Marcia S. Smith, Jeffrey W. Seiffer, Glenn J. McLoughlin & John Moteff, The Internet and the USA Patriot Act: 
Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce and Government, cong. research serv., March 4, 2002, http://
www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/docs/EBB-004.pdf.
86 White Paper, supra note 22, at 3.
87 Id; see also nat’l comm’n: on terrorist attacks uPon the u.s., the 9/11 commission rePort 339-60 (2004), 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/full reportf.pdf; see also oFFice oF the insPector general, a review oF the FBi’s 
handling oF inteligence inFormation related to the sePtemBer 11 attacks 21-42, http://www.justice.gov/oig/
special/s0606/final.pdf.
88 See Samuel Edwards, Barbary General: The Life of  William H. Eaton, 54-55 (Prentice-Hall 1968) (describing 
investigation into plot); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The First Impeachment, 93 (Mercer Univ. Press 1998) (describing plot).
89 David T.Z. Mindich, Lincoln’s Surveillance State, n.y. times, July 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/
opinion/lincolns-surveillance-state.html?_r=0.
90 Id.
91 Brief  of  Defendant- Appellant at 7, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (No.190).
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involving the Justice Department Bureau of  Investigation spying on Congress92 and the Palmer 
Raids, announced that the FBI was concerned only with investigating conduct forbidden by law and 
not opinions, political or otherwise.93  He restricted the use of  wiretaps and referred to the practice 
as unethical.94 
 Four years later, the first electronic surveillance case reached the United States’ Supreme 
Court.95  In the Olmstead case, evidence had been obtained through wiretaps that were inserted along 
the ordinary telephone wires.96  The Court held that because no entry of  the houses or offices of  the 
defendants took place, or in other words, no trespass, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.97  
Despite the dissenting voices,98 the trespass doctrine of  the Fourth Amendment was put in place. 
 The Court stated in Olmstead that although wiretapping was legal via Fourth Amendment 
standards, Congress could choose to bar wiretapping as admissible evidence through legislation.99  
With the Federal Communications Act of  1934, Congress protected wire communications.100  
However, the Federal Communications Act said nothing about the use of  mechanical devices used 
to record in person conversations.101  Without this prohibition, Fourth Amendment cases continued 
to go through the courts and started eroding the trespass doctrine of  Olmstead.102  
ii. Katz, KeitH, and church: on the way to Fisa
 Four decades after Olmstead the Supreme Court finally overruled the trespass doctrine.103  
92 See Athan Theoharis, From the Secret Files of  J. Edgar Hoover 2 (1991).
93 See Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of  the NSA Surveillance Program: The 
FDR Precedent, 60 stan. l. rev. 1023 (Feb. 2008).
94 See Richard E. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America, 89 (1980).
95 See Mark D. Young, Electronic Surveillance in an Era of  Modern Technology and Evolving Threats to National Security, 22 
stan. l. & Pol’y rev. 11, 15 (2011).
96 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
97 Id at 457.
98 Id at 479.
99 Id at 465-466.
100 Pub. L. No. 416 § 605, 48 Stat. 1064 (noting that despite the Federal Communications Act, FDR and the FBI 
continued to use wiretapping, even though the court disallowed wiretapping as evidence in Nardone I and Nardone II.); see 
also Neal Katyal and Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of  the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR 
Precedent, 60 stan. l. rev. 1023 (Feb. 2008) (discussing surveillance during FDR’s administration).
101 See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380-82 (1937); see also Nardone v. United States 308 US 338, 340 (1939) 
(Nardone II) (holding that evidence obtained through wiretapping was not admissible in court).
102 Gina Marie Stevens & Charles Doyle, Privacy: An Overview of  Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic 
Eavesdropping, cong. research serv., Oct. 9, 2012; see also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (saying that the 
use of  a Dictaphone to secretly overhear a private conversation in an adjacent office offended no Fourth Amendment 
protection because no physical trespass into the office in which the conversation took place had occurred); see also Lee 
v. United States 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (noting that the absence of  a physical trespass precluded the Fourth Amendment 
coverage of  where a federal agent secretly recorded his conversation with the defendant held in a commercial laundry in 
a public area); Silverman v. United States, 364, U.S. 505 (1961) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment was violated when the 
government drove a spike mike into the common wall of  a row house until it made contact with a heating duct for the 
home in which the conversation occurred.).
103 Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines of  Intelligence Gathering in Post- 
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In Katz, the Court was confronted with communications obtained by the FBI through electronic 
listening and recording devices that were attached to the outside of  a public telephone booth known 
to be used often by the defendant.104  In its analysis the Court described a new test to be used with 
the Fourth Amendment involving a reasonable expectation of  privacy.105  Even though the phone 
booth was made of  glass and in a public place, the idea that the door shuts provides a reasonable 
person the belief  that their conversations will remain private.106  However, the Court specifically 
stated that this decision did not apply to surveillance under the auspices of  national security.107  
 In response to Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968.108  
The original version of  the Omnibus Act protected unauthorized aural interceptions defined as 
interceptions made by a wire or oral means, understandable by the human ear, and communicated 
via a common carrier.109  This was not a restriction on electronic surveillance, although the Omnibus 
Act was later amended to include electronic communications.110  However the Omnibus Act was still 
not a protection against the President’s power to wiretap without warrants outside of  the United 
States and it did not provide protections for interceptions related to any kind of  foreign surveillance 
or national security protection by the government.111 `
 The Keith decision involved the warrantless electronic surveillance of  a defendant in a federal 
prosecution of  radicals for destruction of  government property.112  The government acknowledged 
the electronic surveillance of  the defendant but argued that since Title III and the Omnibus Crime 
Control Act113 did not mention the limitation of  the presidential power to wiretap domestically to 
protect national security, it had in effect given the power to conduct electronic surveillance directed 
against domestic groups that advanced violence against the government.114  The Justices decided that 
the specific facts of  the case did not justify warrantless surveillance, and therefore the surveillance 
was a violation of  the Fourth Amendment.  However Keith left gaps in the constitutional law of  
intelligence gathering.115  First, the warrant requirement it imposed did not extend to cases involving 
foreign intelligence.  The opinion ended by reiterating that the warrant requirement applied only 
September 11 America, 35 tex. tech. l. rev. 1 (2004).
104 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105 See id. at 351.
106 See id. 
107 Id at 358-64.
108 Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of  Oral Communications, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
22 (2000).
109 See Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines of  Intelligence Gathering in 
Post-September 11 America, 35 tex. tech. l. rev. 1, 8 (2004).
110 See S. Rep. No 99-541 at 1 (1986) (noting that in 1986, the Omnibus Act was amended by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to account for the changes in new computer and telecommunications 
technologies).
111 See Copeland, supra note 109, at 8.
112 United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith) 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
113 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006).
114 Robert C. Power, “Intelligence” Search’s and Purpose: A Significant Mismatch Between Constitutional Criminal Procedure and 
the Law of  Intelligence- Gathering, 30 Pace l. r. 620 (2010).
115 Id at 629.
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to domestic aspects of  national security without fully defining the category.116  Second, the opinion 
emphasized that electronic surveillance for domestic intelligence might be appropriate under 
different standards than those that apply to the criminal law enforcement, noting its own use of  
Constitutional interest balancing for non law enforcement purposes.117  The Court again urged 
Congress to create laws that would regulate surveillance to protect domestic national security.118  The 
Court also recognized that “unless the Government safeguards its own capacity to function and 
to preserve the security of  its people, society itself  could become so disordered that all rights and 
liberties would be endangered.”119 
 Keith was followed by several lower court cases involving surveillance where foreign powers 
were involved, but where the communications of  American citizens were overheard.  The majority 
of  the lower courts upheld warrantless searches, even involves U.S. citizens,120 however the D.C. 
Circuit differed and held that warrantless searches were unconstitutional.121 
 In the following years, a series of  news stories broke detailing the existence of  covert 
domestic surveillance programs directed at U.S. citizens.122  The publicity surrounding the various 
abuses by intelligence agencies, including NSA surveillance of  Americans and drug traffickers, U.S. 
Army military intelligence surveillance of  domestic groups, FBI covert operations against alleged 
subversive groups, CIA opening of  domestic mail sent to or received from abroad, and electronic 
surveillance of  political enemies, fanned by investigations and reports by the Senate, the House, 
and the Executive branch, had significant effects.123  Congress put together a special committee, 
spearheaded by Senator Frank Church, to investigate the many accusations surrounding the abuse of  
power by the Intelligence community.124  Their investigation found that the Intelligence community 
was not the “rogue elephant” they thought, and that almost every activity which had previously 
caused disrepute were ordered by a senior official or the President.125  After the Watergate scandal 
116 Id
117 Id
118 United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972)(stating, “Given those potential distinctions 
between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider 
protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.”).
119 Id at 312.
120 See United State v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding warrantless searches wiretap against US 
citizen); see United States v. Butenko, 494 F. 2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974) (saying that a wiretap is valid if  primary purpose to 
gather foreign intelligence information); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871,875 (9th Cir. 1977) (ruling that warrantless 
surveillance is “lawful for the purpose of  gathering foreign intelligence”).
121 See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding surveillance of  the Jewish Defense League 
unconstitutional because although the JDL was involved in international terrorist activities there was no showing that the 
JDL was itself  a foreign power or an agent of  a foreign power, and therefore did not fit under the Keith exception).
122 See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 harv. J.l. & PuB. Pol’y 
757 (2014) (forthcoming).
123 See William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of  Terrorism: the Intelligence/ Law Enforcement Dilemma- A History, 11 lewis & 
clark l. rev. 1099 (2007).
124 See Robert F. Turner, First Principles: Are Judicial and Legislative Oversight of  NSA Constitutional?, the Federalist 
society For law & PuBlic Policy studies, October 21, 2013.
125 See id. (explaining that Representative Otis Pike who chaired the House Committee investigation on the CIA 
said that after the investigation he had a higher regard for the CIA than when he started. He went on to state that the 
Committee found a multitude of  evidence where the CIA said “don’t do it” and the White House had said “we are 
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came to light, Congress decided that new legislation was needed to legislate the powers around the 
President’s surveillance power.126
 
iii. Fisa
 Senator Kennedy introduced the first draft of  what would later become the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1976.127  After multiple hearings and revisions, President Carter 
signed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) into law on October 25, 1978.128  FISA 
established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  (FISC) in order to hear applications for 
electronic surveillance.129 
 As passed, FISA authorized electronic surveillance130 of  a foreign power131 or agent of  
a foreign power132 to obtain foreign intelligence information via two separate means.  The first 
path to authorization for surveillance would be for the Attorney General to certify under oath 
that the surveillance was solely directed at the communications transmitted exclusively between 
certain foreign powers, and that the surveillance was not intended to and was unlikely to taint the 
communications of  a U.S. person.133  This type of  surveillance could be authorized for up to one 
year.134  For all other circumstances, FISA requires the FISC to authorize surveillances.135  In order 
to obtain an order from the FISC, the Attorney General must submit an application that includes 
information about the identity or a description of  the target of  the surveillance, the facts and 
circumstances justifying the belief  that the target is a foreign power or agent of  a power, the means 
by which the surveillance will be implemented and minimization procedures, as well as a description 
of  the type of  information sought and the type of  communication or activities that are subject to 
going to anyway.” The CIA was much more professional and had a far deeper reading on the down the road implications 
of  some immediately popular act than the executive branch or administrative officials.  The CIA never did anything the 
White House didn’t want. Sometimes they didn’t want to do what they did); see also Frank J. Smith, Jr., Congress Oversees the 
United States Intelligence Community 197 (1990).
126 See Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The DC Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of  1978, 61 geo. 
wash. l. rev. 1380, 1382-87 (1993).
127 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 (1982).
128 See Funk, supra note 123, at 1112.
129 See § 1803(a).
130 See § 1801(f) (defining electronic surveillance to include four different forms of  surveillance. The first would 
include ordinary wiretaps. The second and third would include various radio communications, and the last would be 
include the ordinary “bugging.” Together this was intended to cover all electronic surveillance in the United Sates 
directed at persons in the United States. It was not intended to cover surveillances abroad or even surveillance of  
communications to the United States if  conducted abroad); H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 50-51 (1978).
131 See § 1801(a) (defining foreign power as two separate sets of  entities.  The first set included foreign government or 
factions of  foreign nations, and the second set included groups involved in international terrorism.).
132 See § 1801(b); see Clapper, supra note 39 (defining an agent of  power differently depending upon whether the 
person was a US citizen. If  the person was not a US person, any officer or employee or member of  a foreign power 
would qualify as an agent of  a foreign power, and additionally if  any person acted on behalf  of, or assisted a foreign 
power in sabotage or international terrorism would qualify as an agent to a foreign power).
133 50 U.S.C.§ 1802(a)(1) (1982).
134 See id.
135 § 1802(b).
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surveillance.136  
 Three certificates are required to accompany the application to the FISC stating that the 
purpose of  the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, that the information sought 
is foreign intelligence information, and that the information cannot be reasonably obtained through 
normal means.137  One of  the FISC judges then reviews the application making sure that all of  the 
minimization procedures are met, and that there is sufficient probable cause to believe that the 
target is a foreign power.138  The original authorizations from the FISC are for ninety-day periods of  
surveillance, although they can be renewed as needed.139 
 It is clear from the brief  legislative history detailed above that FISA was meant as a 
protection for U.S. citizens against warrantless searches.  However, the legislature still knew that 
the protection of  national security remained paramount and because of  that, surveillance would be 
allowed, but it would now have the oversight of  its own court with judges specially acquainted with 
the laws and needs of  national security.  FISC provides the vehicle for foreign surveillance warrants 
to be obtained, with a differing standard from the warrant procedures of  criminal law.  Hence, FISA 
can be seen as an extra protection for those worried about Nixon Era wiretapping resurfacing.
iv. Fisa Post 9/11
 After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, legislators 
quickly expressed frustration with the failure of  intelligence agencies and law enforcement to 
prevent such a large-scale attack.140  The Attorney General asked that Congress grant the Justice 
Department greater power to prevent future terrorists acts.141  Within six weeks of  the attacks, 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, a warp speed for the legislature.142  The USA PATRIOT 
Act made numerous changes and amendments to existing law, including several distinct changes 
in FISA.143  The USA PATRIOT Act changed the test used for issuance of  a FISA surveillance 
order from “the purpose of  the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information”144 to “a 
significant purpose of  the surveillance must be for obtaining foreign intelligence.”145  This small 
phrasing change signaled a significant change in the standard for issuance of  FISA Surveillance.146  
136 § 1804(a)(3)-(6), (8).
137 § 1804(a)(7).
138 § 18095(a)(3).
139 50 U.S.C. § 1805(d)(1) (1982).
140 See Michael T. McCarthy, U.S.A. Patriot Act, 39 harv. J. on legis. 435, 438-39 (2002) (saying that prior to 
September 11, the CIA had intelligence on two of  the hijackers identifying them as suspected terrorist, but the agency 
failed to share that information with FBI in time for them to prevent the hijackers from entering the country).
141 See id. at 437-38.
142 Id.
143 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act of  2001), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of  the U.S.C).
144 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (1991).
145 50 U.S.C. § 1801(A)(7)(B) (2003).
146 Jennifer L. Sullivan, From “The Purpose” to “a Significant Purpose”: Assessing the constitutionality of  the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Under the Fourth Amendment, 19 notre dame J. l. ethics & PuB. Pol’y 379 (2005).
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Other issues besides foreign intelligence could be investigated, as long as the foreign intelligence 
element was still prominent.  Other changes included the addition of  roving wiretaps, the ability 
to secretly survey email communications, and an expanded duration for which a FISA warrant is 
valid.147 
 FISA has continued to change since the USA PATRIOT Act.  The 2008 FISA Amendments 
preserved the changes to FISA made by the USA PATRIOT Act.  Besides proving that the gathering 
of  foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of  the wiretap, the government must, in addition, 
establish a reason for the belief  that the target is an agent or employee of  a foreign power.148  The 
2008 Amendments also changed the original FISA standard for non-U.S. persons, who are located 
abroad.  As per the original statute, no warrant is required if  the wiretap does not require access to 
facilities located in the United States, for a non-U.S. person.149  However when the wiretap requires 
access to facilities in the United States, a FISA warrant is required, although the government must 
only prove that a significant purpose of  the tap is to procure foreign intelligence information.  The 
2008 Amendments also relives the government of  the need to disclose to a FISA judge the identity 
of  each individual to be targeted.  The amendments only require that the government describe and 
employ procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its proposed surveillance activity will only 
target foreigners abroad.150 
 The USA PATRIOT Act and the 2008 FISA Amendments definitely broadened the 
scope of  the government’s authority to wiretap.  However, it is still more limited than pre-FISA 
surveillance authority.  One important thing to notice is that FISA was originally enacted to monitor 
the domestic surveillance of  foreign powers, which has now morphed into protections guaranteed 
against non-U.S. persons abroad.  Most of  the overreaching amendments of  current day FISA are 
applicable only to non-U.S. persons abroad; these people are not, nor ever were, protected by the 
Constitution. In effect, FISA extends protections out to members of  the world community that 
historically have no Constitutional protections, in order to placate the fears of  an overreaching 
government by U.S. citizens. 
 Taking into consideration the overwhelming globalization151 of  the American economy and 
culture, it is inevitable that some U.S. person’s information will be collected. FISA provides an extra 
layer of  protection via the FISC, and via mandated minimization procedures. In light of  the recent 
NSA disclosures, focus should be shifted from the Constitutionality of  FISA to the congratulations 
of  the Intelligence Community on the relatively small number of  violations for such an overarching 
program in the new globalized world. 
147 See Copeland, supra note 103; see also Sullivan, supra note 147.
148 See FISA Amendments ACT of  2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2012).
149 Id.
150 § 1881(a)-(g); see also William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of  Needles in Haystacks, 88 tex. l. rev. 
1633 (2010).
151 See generally Elizabeth B. Bazan, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of  Selected Issues, cong. research 
serv., July 7, 2008, at 7.
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iv. walking the line oF the Fourth amendment: Privacy versus national security
 One of  the main issues with the Snowden revelations was the confrontation of  where the 
line between civil liberties, primarily privacy, and national security lies.152  The Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures—basically the right of  privacy from the 
government for individuals. This paper has already touched upon some Fourth Amendment issues 
in Part Three, but mainly in relation to FISA.  Even though there is statutory law backing up the 
national security surveillances that have been released, this next section will talk about how the 
Fourth Amendment interacts with the activities of  the NSA. 
i. the third Party doctrine
 The Third Party doctrine of  the Fourth Amendment provides that any information willingly 
exposed to a third party loses all Fourth Amendment protection.  The theory reasons that once 
a person shares information willingly with a third party, one assumes the risk that the third party 
may divulge that information to others, including the government.153  Under longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent, the Third Party doctrine holds that even if  there is an understanding that the third 
party will treat the information as conditional, the information is no longer protected under the 
Fourth Amendment.154  These facts alone would be enough to justify the application of  the third 
party doctrine to the telephony metadata collection program conducted by the NSA. However, 
the Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of  telephone data, and Fourth Amendment 
implications via the Fourth Amendment with Smith v. Maryland.155 
 In Smith, the Court held that the installation of  a pen register was not a search within 
the meaning of  the Fourth Amendment and thus that no warrant was required to collect such 
information.156  The pen register collected the dialed phone numbers from the telephone company.157 
It did not constitute a search because persons making phone calls lack a reasonable expectation 
of  privacy in the numbers they dial.158  The Court explained that even if  someone did intend to 
keep the numbers they dialed secret, the person has “voluntarily conveyed numerical information 
to the telephone company and exposed that information to its equipment in the ordinary scope of  
business and therefore has assumed the risk the company would reveal to the police the numbers 
which were dialed.”159 
152 See Robert N. Davis, Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties, 29 Brook. J. int’l l. 175 (2003).
153 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
154 See White Paper, supra note 22, at 20; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (“This Court has held repeatedly that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of  information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to 
the Government authorities, even if  the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”); see also SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brian, Inc., 467 
U.S. 735, 743 (1984).
155 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
156 See id. at 745-46.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1879).
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 Under Smith the telephony metadata program conducted by the NSA is clearly within 
Constitutional bounds.  As previously discussed, the metadata only reveals the basics of  the call 
information such as the numbers dialed and the length and time of  dialing.160  Some scholars might 
argue that it is not the individual’s rights that are being infringed upon, but the telecommunications 
providers.  However, the Court has also stated that Fourth Amendment rights “are personal in 
nature, and cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a reasonable expectation 
of  privacy in the place to be searched.”161  Therefore, the telecommunications providers may not 
assert the Fourth Amendment rights of  their customers.  Under this same principle, there is no 
Fourth Amendment expectation of  privacy by virtue of  the fact that the telephony metadata records 
of  many individuals are collected rather than those of  a single individual.162 
 Additionally, the courts have extended the Smith reasoning to issues in matter of  electronic 
communications.163  The overwhelming trend among courts has been to find that individuals have no 
reasonable expectation of  privacy when it comes to information voluntarily disclosed to an Internet 
Service Provider.164  
 For Fourth Amendment purposes, courts have considered email metadata to be analogous 
to telephone calls and to letters sent through the postal system.165  The metadata the government 
collects through phone records and Internet communications is like the information that appears 
on mail covers, including the name and address of  the addressee and of  the sender, the postmark, 
and the class of  mail, all of  which is considered unprotected in Fourth Amendment terms.166  This 
issue between what can be counted as protected information versus unprotected information is 
clarified in the content/envelope distinction.167  Courts recognize that while a third party may have 
physical control over an individual’s information, such control does not make all expectations of  
privacy unreasonable.168  Rather only the information that the third party sees, like the address, is 
160 See Newell, supra note 16.
161 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 219 (1981); accord, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) 
(“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.”).
162 White Paper, supra note 22, at 21.
163 See Memorandum from Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, Subject: Proposed Amendment to 
Department of  Defense Procedures to Permit the National Security Agency to Conduct Analysis of  Communications 
Metadata Associated with Persons in the United States, to the Attorney General, November 20, 2007 at 5, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world.interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-data-collection-justice-department.
164 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lifschitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(reasonable expectation of  privacy exists on home computers, but it is gone when it is transmitted over the internet or 
email and received by a third person); see also Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and 
the Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of  Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 ucla J. l. & tech., no. 1, 2007.
165 See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 
(C.A.A.F. 1996).
166 See United States v. Choate, 576 F. 2d 165 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. DePoli, 628 F.2d 779 (2d. Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Huie, 593 F. 2d 14 (5th Cir. 1979); Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F. 2d 343 (10th Cir. 1983) (a mail cover which 
records information about the sender and recipient of  a letter, is indistinguishable in any important respect from the pen 
register at issue in Smith).
167 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 nw. u. l. rev. 607, 
611 L. 648, 676-678 (2002).
168 Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 geo. wash. l. rev., 1264, 1286 (2004) (explaining 
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unprotected, while the contents of  the communication still remain hidden, are protected. 
 The content/envelope distinction further verifies the government’s telephone and electronic 
metadata collection.  The government is not looking at any of  the contents of  the email169 or 
listening to the conversations of  the phone call, or the content; rather, the government is in effect 
only collecting the unprotected “envelope” data from the surveillance—metadata. 
ii. the mosaic theory
 There are two different, but similar ideas that are relevant to the mosaic theory concerning 
the NSA metadata collection program. First, there is the theory of  intelligence gathering that is 
known as the “mosaic theory.”170  The “mosaic” is the overall picture that is put together by drawing 
inferences from seemingly disparate pieces of  information.171  An example of  some of  the pieces 
of  information that would be used in intelligence gathering is the NSA’s collection of  metadata.  It 
is studied and analyzed to extrapolate information about terrorists, and terrorist threats to national 
security.
 The second “mosaic theory” that needs to be discussed is the mosaic theory of  the Fourth 
Amendment.  The mosaic theory was introduced in United States v. Maynard,172 and although it has 
never explicitly been endorsed by the Supreme Court, the recent decision in the case of  United States 
v. Jones173 endorsed some form of  the mosaic theory, although not per se.  The mosaic theory of  the 
Fourth Amendment comes from the same idea of  the intelligence gathering theory of  the mosaic 
theory.  Put simply, the mosaic theory states that searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence 
of  steps rather than as individual steps. Many non-searches packaged together as a collective entity 
become a search because the individual pieces of  the puzzle that seem small in isolation could be 
assembled together like a mosaic to reveal the full picture of  a person’s life.174  
 The Supreme Court specifically limited its analysis in Jones to the trespass nature of  a GPS 
on a car, and did not address the national security exception to the Fourth Amendment.175  However, 
it is obvious that these two theories are essentially after the same thing, with drastically divergent 
implications for the metadata collection program.  The whole idea behind the metadata program 
is to look for patterns, and deduce information that would be useful in preventing terrorism, 
producing a mosaic of  the terrorists’ activities.  But court precedent has said that searches that reveal 
“ECPA largely tracks the distinction made by the Court in Smith v. Maryland, between what Kerr calls ‘envelope’ and 
‘content’ information. Analogizing to postal mail, Kerr states that ‘the content information is the letter itself, stored 
safely inside its envelope. The envelope information is the information derived from the outside of  the envelope, 
including the mailing and return addresses, the stamp and postmark, and the size and weight of  the envelope when 
sealed.’) (quoting Kerr, supra note 168, at 611-16).
169 See Lawless, supra note 165.
170 Michael P. Goodwin, A National Security Puzzle: Mosaic Theory and the First Amendment Right of  Access in the Federal 
Courts, 32 hastings comm. & ent. l. J. 179, 185 (2010).
171 Id.
172 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
173 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
174 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of  the Fourth Amendment, 111 mich. l. rev. 311, 325 (2012).
175 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945.
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the mosaic of  a person’s life are in violation of  the Fourth Amendment.  Many scholars176 dislike the 
mosaic approach to the Fourth Amendment and state that it is unworkable for future cases, since all 
detective work could be extrapolated to fit the mosaic theory if  the right facts arose.
 Clearly, the mosaic theory of  the Fourth Amendment needs to be clarified in terms of  
national security and the overall theory of  intelligence gathering.  However, supposing that the 
mosaic theory were to apply, inferring that the metadata collection being done by the NSA was a 
search under the Fourth Amendment, it would be overcome by one of  two things. 
 First, the FISA court issues orders allowing the surveillance and reviewing the evidence 
just like in a warrant application.  While the standards are different for FISA issues and for regular 
criminal issues, the FISC order essentially has the protection of  a warrant because of  the nature of  
the FISC oversight. 
 Secondly, even if  the NSA collection program were to fall under the meaning of  a search 
under the mosaic theory, and the FISC order was not considered a sufficient national security 
warrant, the court would then have to go through the standard balancing act of  the Fourth 
Amendment.  That standard requires a balancing of  “the promotion of  legitimate Governmental 
interest against the degree the search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.”177  If  any Fourth 
Amendment privacy interest were implicated in the collection of  telephony metadata it would be 
limited, and is severely outweighed by the public interest of  the prevention of  terrorist attacks. 
The telephony metadata is a forward-looking prevention of  the loss of  life, including potentially 
on a catastrophic scale, as opposed to “ordinary crime solving”178 which is a regressive attempt 
to solve or prevent future crimes.  Given the important objective and the minimal, if  any, Fourth 
Amendment intrusions that the telephony metadata collection program entails, the program would 
be constitutional even if  the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard applied.179 
iii. conclusion
                                                                         180
 General Alexander’s statement to the House Committee On Intelligence resonates deeply. 
The Snowden leaks exposed many of  the secret activities of  our government, the activities that 
176 See generally Kerr, supra note 175; Goodwin, supra note 171; see also, Benjamin M. Ostrander, The Mosaic Theory and 
Fourth Amendment Law, 86 notre dame l. rev. 1733 (2011).
177 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).
178 Id. at 1982 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179 White Paper, supra note 22, at 21.
180 June 18, 2013 HPSCI Hearing, supra note 21 (statement of  General Keith Alexander).
“Let me start by saying that I would much rather be here today 
debating this point than trying to explain how we failed to prevent 
another 9/11. It is a testament to the ongoing teamwork of  the 
Central Intelligence Agency, The Federal Bureau of  Investigation 
and the National Security Agency, working with our allies and then 
industry partner, that we have been able to connect the dots and 
prevent more terrorist attacks.” 
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are put in place to keep us safe and protect our civil liberties, not take them away. The media has 
run rampant with claims of  the Government listening to Americans’ phone calls, reading emails, 
and tracking the Internet history of  thousands upon thousands of  innocent Americans, without 
warrants, violating the very freedom that the Government should be protecting. But upon deep 
examination of  the documents leaked, the media’s messages flounder.  
 The documents show extensive procedures and policies put in place by the Intelligence 
Community to protect American’s information. They show the oversight and checks and balances of  
our government. The documents show that while the idea of  the Government having access to the 
telephony metadata of  Americans is uncomfortable, it is necessary for the protection of  America 
against the evolving world of  international terrorism.
 While the continued disclosures from the Guardian and Snowden continue to make 
Americans feel uncomfortable or ‘itchy’ it is important to remember that technology and FISA 
surveillance is something that we will have to learn to live with, just like the bomb. It may not be 
easy, but it has not killed us yet.
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